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Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham-Confusion
Returns To Maritime Wrongful Death Actions
In 1967, a helicopter carrying three passengers and a pilot
returning from an offshore drilling platform crashed into the Gulf
of Mexico beyond Louisiana's territorial waters, killing all
aboard. The families of the decedents instituted a wrongful death
suit in admiralty,' seeking recovery under general maritime law,
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), and the Jones Act. 3
The federal district court found Mobil Oil Corporation, the owner
and operator of the helicopter, negligent.' In awarding damages
the district court limited recovery to pecuniary losses, holding
that a pecuniary loss limitation applied regardless of the theory
of recovery.' Specifically, the court denied plaintiffs recovery for
loss of society damages.6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that under recent Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit decisions, beneficiaries of a decedent wrongfully killed on
the high seas could recover loss of society damages under general
maritime law despite the pecuniary loss limitation of DOHSA.7
1. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973). The district
court based admiralty jurisdiction on a finding that the helicopter performed the functions
of a crewboat. Id. at 1167. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on Executive Jet
Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), which held that locality alone is not
enough to satisfy admiralty jurisdiction; rather the Supreme Court adopted a "locality
plus" test, which requires that "the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity." Id. at 268. See also Bridwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The
Outlook for the Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757.
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
3. Id. § 688.
4. 357 F. Supp. at 1174. The court dismissed all claims against Bell Helicopter Co.,
the manufacturer of the helicopter. Id. at 1172.
5. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (W.D. La. 1973). This
holding, however, preceded Sea*Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), which
held that under general maritime law nonpecuniary losses are recoverable. See text ac-
companying notes 36-42 infra.
6. Loss of society refers to "a broad range of mutual benefits each family member
receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort, and protection." Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573,
585 (1974) (footnote omitted). See also S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3.49
(2d ed. 1975).
If the court had awarded loss of society damages, it would have awarded one family
$100,000 and another family $155,000. 360 F. Supp. at 1145-48. Mobil did not challenge
the propriety of the amount of these awards at the Supreme Court level. Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 n.20 (1978).
7. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1977). In reaching
this conclusion the court of appeals relied on Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242,
rehearing denied, 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975), which in turn relied on two Supreme Court
cases, Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) and Moragne v. States Marine
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Because of conflicting decisions in the circuit courts of appeals
regarding the precise limits of the cause of action and remedies
for wrongful death under general maritime law,8 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari9 and, reversing the court of appeals, held
in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham'0 that nonpecuniary damages
could not supplement DOHSA's pecuniary loss limitation; thus,
the Court reinstated the district court's holding and denied recov-
ery for loss of society damages."
Consequently, DOHSA now provides the exclusive remedy
for wrongful deaths occurring on the high seas. 2 By so holding,
however, the Court ignored the legislative history of DOHSA,
which does not mandate this result. 3 Moreover, Higginbotham
not only restores various anomalies to maritime wrongful death
actions that earlier decisions sought to eliminate, but also con-
travenes the humane policies of admiralty law.' The Court's de-
cision, therefore, retreats from the modem trend toward fashion-
ing a uniform cause of action and remedy for maritime wrongful
deaths and creates further confusion in maritime law."'
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). If presented as an original matter, the court of appeals
would have denied recovery for loss of society damages and held that DOHSA was the
exclusive wrongful death remedy on the high seas. The court held, however, that the Law
decision had foreclosed the issue in the Fifth Circuit. Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
545 F.2d 422, 436 n.19 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. The Fifth Circuit had allowed remedies under general maritime law to supplement
DOHSA. Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, rehearing denied, 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
1975). The First Circuit, however, had held that in wrongful death suits on the high seas,
DOHSA was the exclusive remedy. Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
9. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 434 U.S. 816 (1977). The Court limited its
review to deciding "[w]hether the maritime cause of action for death occurring within a
state's territorial waters created by this court in [Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970)] completely replaces the statutory cause of action for death mandated
by Congress with respect to deaths occurring within the geographical scope of the Death
on the High Seas Act." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
10. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
11. Id. at 626.
12. Because Congress limited DOHSA to wrongful death actions on the high seas,
Higginbotham presumably does not foreclose the application of general maritime law to
other high sea maritime tort actions, such as survival and nonfatal personal injury actions.
See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974); Spiller v. Thomas
M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972) (application of general maritime
law to survival actions on the high seas).
13. See text accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 67-72 infra.
15. In rejecting the argument that DOHSA is the exclusive remedy for wrongful death
on the high seas, Chief Judge Brown, writing for the court in Law v. Sea Drilling Corp.,
510 F.2d 242, rehearing denied, 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975), stated: "No longer does one
need a state court, or The Admiralty as a Court, or DOHSA as a remedy. There is a federal
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Prior to 1970, general maritime law, while allowing recovery
for injuries, recognized no action for wrongful death absent legis-
lation specifically authorizing such recovery. 6 Although all the
states had wrongful death statutes, 7 territorial limitations often
prevented the statutes from covering deaths on the high seas. IS
Also, because of the unique status of seamen, 9 the state statutes
were often unavailable to them.'" Thus, to supplement state stat-
utes Congress in 1920 enacted the Jones Act, which provided
protection for seamen,' and DOHSA, which created a cause of
action for wrongful death on the high seas but explicitly left state
maritime cause of action for death on navigable waters-any navigable waters-and it can
be enforced in any court." Id. at 798.
16. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The Harrisburg extended the holding of
Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878), to general maritime law. Brame held that
American common law provided no cause of action for wrongful death. The source of
Brame's holding stems from Lord Ellensborough's dictum in Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1033 (1808), that the cause of action died with the individual. See generally George
& Moore, Wrongful Death and Survival Actions under the General Maritime Law: Pre-
Harrisburg through Post-Moragne, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1972); Winfield, Death as
Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Higginbotham, sarcastically commented:
"The Court in The Harrisburg arrived at its conclusion after rejecting arguments founded
on nothing more than 'good reason,' 'natural equity,' and the experience of nations like
France and Scotland." 436 U.S. at 621 n.14.
17. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971). For a list
of all current state wrongful death statutes see S. SPEISER, supra note 6, app. A.
18. See generally Magruder & Groat, Wrongful Death within the Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 35 YALE L.J. 395 (1926); Robinson, Wrongful Death in Admiralty and the
Conflicts of Law, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 406 (1936); Comment, The Application of State
Survival Statutes in Maritime Causes, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 534 (1960); Comment, Collisions
in Territorial Waters and the Conflicts of Law, 33 YALE L.J. 867 (1924).
19. Seaman refers to any person eligible to recover under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1976)-an Act designed exclusively to benefit seamen injured or killed in the course
of employment. See note 21 infra. Generally, the Jones Act extends to "members of a crew
of a vessel plying in navigable waters." Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
Courts, however, have varied between a broad and narrow definition of a vessel. Compare
Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1972) (oiler working
on a dragline loaded on a spud barge is a seaman) with Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 472 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1972) (carpenter on a floating construction platform moored
in navigable waters is not a seaman). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF
ADMIRALTY § 6:21 (2d ed. 1975). Because a precise definition of seaman is beyond the
scope of this comment, a court's determination of who is or is not a seaman is accepted.
20. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Chelentis v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
21. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The primary purpose for enacting the Jones Act was to
give seamen a cause of action for negligence-an action denied to seamen by The Osceola,
189 U.S. 158 (1903). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at § 6:20.
The Jones Act provided seamen and their personal representatives an action for injury
or death caused by an employer's negligence. The Act adopted the provisions of the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), which, like DOHSA,
limits damages to pecuniary loss. See note 52 infra.
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statutes to govern in state territorial waters. 22 After 1920, then,
the beneficiary of the victim of a maritime wrongful death had
three possible theories of recovery as a substitute for general mar-
itime law: DOHSA, the Jones Act, and state wrongful death stat-
utes.
Between 1920 and 1970, however, anomalies developed be-
cause of the territorial and statutory limitations of these three
means of recovery.2 The anomalies stem from the statutes' fail-
ures to provide adequate remedies for the doctrine of unseawor-
thiness, which predicates liability on the breach of a shipowner's
obligation to provide a ship reasonably able to perform its in-
tended journeys .2 First, if a Jones Act seaman was injured in
territorial waters because of an unseaworthy vessel, he could re-
cover under general maritime law. 5 But if the seaman died in
territorial waters, his beneficiary was denied any recovery under
all three statutory theories .2 Second, a breach of the unseawor-
thiness doctrine on the high seas produced liability under
DOHSA, but an identical breach produced no liability within
territorial waters, unless the victim was a longshoreman covered
by a state statute encompassing unseaworthiness. 2 Finally, a
Jones Act seaman had no cause of action for an unseaworthiness-
caused death in territorial waters, but a longshoreman, killed in
22. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976). DOHSA gave the personal representative of any
person wrongfully killed on the high seas the right to maintain a suit for damages for the
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, or dependent relative. Congress limited
DOHSA to the high seas beyond a marine league from shore and explicitly left state
statutes to govern in state territorial waters. See text accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
23. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
24. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). Seegenerally Chamlee, TheAbsolute Warranty
of Seaworthiness: A History and Comparative Study, 24 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1973); Foley,
A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. REV. 369 (1967). When
Congress passed DOHSA and the Jones Act in 1920, seamen rarely relied on unseaworthi-
ness as a means of recovery. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at § 6:38. During
the 1940's, however, the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine by the inclusion of
"operating negligence." See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
25. McAllister v. Magnolia Petro. Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158 (1903).
26. DOHSA, being limited to the high seas, would not apply. Because the victim was
a seaman, state statutes were unavailable. See note 20 supra. Finally, the Jones Act
limited recovery to negligence and under Supreme Court decisions precluded unseaworthi-
ness claims. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Lindgren v.
United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
27. Under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.$. 85 (1946), the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness applied to longshoremen. The Supreme Court, however, refused to supplement
state statutes with unseaworthiness claims in the absence of an affirmative holding by the
state courts that the statute included unseaworthiness. See Hess v. United States, 361
U.S. 314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
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the same accident, would have a cause of action if the state stat-
ute encompassed unseaworthiness. 5
In 1970, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. ,29 the Su-
preme Court expressly sought to eliminate these anomalies.30
Moragne involved the death of a longshoreman killed in Florida
territorial waters. Because general maritime law allowed no cause
of action for wrongful death and the Florida wrongful death stat-
ute did not encompass unseaworthiness, the longshoreman's
widow had no wrongful death cause of action for unseaworthi-
ness.3 1 The Court in Moragne, however, created an action for
wrongful death under general maritime law.3 2 By creating this
action Moragne sought "to supplant the present disarray in this
area with a rule both simpler and more just." Thus, although
the death in Moragne occurred in territorial waters, the Court's
desire to eliminate anomalies partly based on DOHSA's terri-
torial limitation suggests that this new cause of action extended
to wrongful deaths on the high seas despite DOHSA.3 1 The Court,
however, left to future litigation the precise limits of the newly
created cause of action, suggesting that lower courts look to both
DOHSA and state statutes for "persuasive analogy.
35
Four years later in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet3 the
Court gave even clearer indications of abandoning the territorial
waters/high seas distinction by analogizing to state statutes
rather than DOHSA. The issue involved in Gaudet was whether
the widow of a longshoreman killed in Louisiana territorial waters
could maintain a Moragne wrongful death action even though her
husband had recovered for his injuries prior to his death. The
Court allowed such an action and then identified the particular
28. See Gill v. United States, 184 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J., dissenting).
29. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
30. Id. at 396-97.
31. Id. at 376. See also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
1968) (Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state wrongful death statute).
32. In order to create this action the Court overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886). 398 U.S. at 409.
33. 398 U.S. at 405.
34. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 19, at § 6:32. Moragne itself contains
conflicting language as to whether or not the holding is broad enough to include the high
seas. The actual holding of the case contains no territorial limitation. 398 U.S. at 409.
Other parts of the opinions, however, imply that the new cause of action only covers
situations not covered by DOHSA. I. at 402. After Moragne, lower courts split on whether
Moragne applied to the high seas. Compare Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.
La. 1971) with McPherson v. S.S. South Africa Pioneer, 321 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Va. 1971).
35. 398 U.S. at 408.
36. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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damages recoverable in a Moragne wrongful death action.37 In
allowing recovery for loss of society damages, the Court rejected
applying DOHSA's pecuniary loss limitation, relying instead on
the fact that a majority of state statutes allowed recovery of such
damages.3 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, recognized the
decision permitted recovery of damages not recoverable under
DOHSA but noted that Congress traditionally has allowed the
courts to determine the rules of admiralty law, ' and that the
humanitarian policy of admiralty law "compelled" allowing re-
covery of loss of society damages.'0 Justice Powell in his dissent
also noted that "the Court's holding that loss of society may be
recovered is a clear example of the majority's repudiation of the
congressional purpose in DOHSA and the Jones Act."" Thus,
although the death in Gaudet occurred in territorial waters, nei-
ther the majority nor dissenting opinions indicate any intent to
limit the holding to territorial waters; indeed, the fact that both
opinions recognize the holding deviates from DOHSA's standard
suggests just the opposite. 2 Implicitly, then, Gaudet's loss of so-
ciety damages were recoverable on the high seas under a Moragne
wrongful death action despite DOHSA's pecuniary loss limita-
tion.
Higginbotham, however, read Gaudet narrowly, limiting
Gaudet to territorial waters.' 3 Thus, the DOHSA pecuniary loss
standard applies to all actions for wrongful deaths on the high
seas, while Gaudet's nonpecuniary loss standard applies to terri-
torial waters. In refusing to supplement DOHSA with Gaudet,
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that the
Court has "no authority to substitute [its] views for those ex-
pressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute."" Justice Stevens
is correct if the pecuniary loss limitation of DOHSA is in fact
exclusive. If DOHSA is not exclusive, however, nothing pre-
vents the Court from supplementing it if such action promotes
37. Id. at 585-90.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id. at 588 n.22.
40. Id. at 588.
41. Id. at 605 (footnotes omitted) (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. See Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, rehearing denied, 523 F.2d 793 (5th
Cir. 1975). The commentators also have read Gaudet to apply to the high seas. G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 19, at § 6:33; 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 750 (1974).
43. "The Gaudet opinion was broadly written. It did not state that the place where
death occurred had an influence on its analysis. Gaudet may be read, as it has been, to
replace entirely the Death on the High Seas Act. It's holding, however, applies only to
coastal waters." 436 U.S. at 622-23 (footnotes omitted).
44. Id. at 626.
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the best interests of admiralty law. Unfortunately, the Court
never adequately addressed the issue. As Justice Marshall stated
in his dissenting opinion, "the fundamental premise of the
[majority's] opinion-that Congress meant to 'limi[t] survivors
to recovery of their pecuniary losses,' . . . is simply assumed.
4 5
Had the Court addressed the issue, it would have found a
congressional intent that DOHSA damages be nonexclusive.
DOHSA's purpose-was to provide a cause of action where none
existed without pre-empting state statutes." Congressional de-
bate prior to enactment focused on section 7, which, as originally
drafted, explicitly stated DOHSA would not pre-empt state
statutes within territorial waters.7 An amendment to section 7,
however, deleted the words "within the territorial limits of any
state."" The amendment's purpose was to assure that DOHSA
"would not interfere in any way with rights now granted by any
State statute, whether the cause of action accrued within the
territorial limits of the state or not."" Logically, then, if Congress
still intended previously controlling state statutes to govern,
DOHSA is nonexclusive on the high seas; that is, DOHSA creates
a minimum standard for recovery, not the only standard. 50 There-
fore, DOHSA's presence should not preclude supplementing the
federal statutory remedy with loss of society damages recoverable
under the wrongful death action of general maritime law created
in Moragne."
The Jones Act further supports the conclusion that Moragne
45. Id. at 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. S. Rm,. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-5 (1920).
47. As originally drafted, the relevant part of § 7 stated: "That the provisions of
any state statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
affected by this act as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any
state." S. 2085, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 59 CONG. REc. 4482 (1920).
48. As enacted, the relevant part of § 7 states: "That the provisions of any state
statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by
this act." 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).
49. 59 CONG. REc. 4484 (1920) (remarks by Representative Mann, the amendment's
sponsor).
50. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 629 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
51. Although the amendment to section 7 indicates Congress did not intend DOHSA
to preempt state wrongful death statutes, most federal courts held that for purposes of
uniformity the presence of any federal statute superseded state law. See, e.g., Middleton
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 239 U.S. 577 (1934); Petition
of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Contra, Safir v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Moragne and Gaudet, however, create
a federal action and remedy that in the absence of a showing that DOHSA damages are
exclusive, stands on equal footing with it.
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and Gaudet should supplement DOHSA. Like DOHSA, the Jones
Act is federal legislation limiting recovery to pecuniary losses.52
Prior to Moragne, the Court held the Jones Act exclusive for
seamen killed in territorial waters.53 In Moragne and Gaudet,
however, the Court seemed willing to permit a Jones Act sea-
man's survivor to benefit from general maritime law by allowing
recovery for loss of society damages for a death occuring in terri-
torial waters. 5 The Court, then, should permit the same recover-
ies on the high seas under general maritime law where equally
"exclusive" federal legislation, DOHSA, operates. 5
Thus, because the legislative history of DOHSA and the
Jones Act viewed in light of Moragne and Gaudet suggest that
DOHSA is not exclusive on the high seas, nothing prevented the
Court from supplementing DOHSA with Gaudet damages." By
refusing to do this, however, and thus limiting Gaudet to terri-
torial waters, Higginbotham restores anomalies Moragne and
Gaudet sought to eliminate. Because Higginbotham holds
DOHSA exclusive on the high seas and because earlier decisions
limited Jones Act recovery exclusively to negligence, consistency
requires the Higginbotham Court deny the Gaudet remedy to
seamen's beneficiaries for deaths in territorial waters.57 Denying
the Gaudet remedy because of the exclusive nature of these acts
52. FELA, which the Jones Act incorporates, contains no statutory language limiting
damages to pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted FELA to con-
tain such a limitation. See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe R.R. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173,
175 (1913).
53. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
54. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970). While
Moragne and Gaudet both involved deaths of longshoremen, nothing in either opinion
suggests that the holding is so limited. See generally G. GiLMoRE & C. BlACK, supra note
19, at § 6:33.
55. Even prior to Moragne, courts allowed DOHSA and the Jones Act to supplement
each other. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958); Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1966); The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399
(D. Mass. 1947).
56. In rejecting this argument Justice Stevens stated: "DOHSA ... announces Con-
gress' considered judgment on such issues as . . . damages. . . . The Act does not
address every issue of wrongful-death law, . . . but when it does speak directly to a
question, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the
Act becomes meaningless." 436 U.S. at 625.
57. Allowing seamen the Gaudet remedy in territorial waters would seem to require
allowing thL same remedy on the high seas, as the Jones Act contains no territorial
limitations. Such an interpretation would lead to the further anomaly of allowing seamen
to recover nonpecuniary damages but denying these damages to nonseamen. Since two of
the decedents in Higginbotham were Jones Act seamen, see Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), presumably the Court does not intend such an inter-
pretation.
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also would seem to require precluding Moragne unseaworthiness
claims by Jones Act seamen for accidents in territorial waters
because the Jones Act limits seamen to negligence.18 Thus,
Higginbotham, if so interpreted, effectively overrules Moragne by
restoring the anomaly of denying a beneficiary a cause of action
for the death of a seaman in territorial waters caused by unsea-
worthiness while allowing a cause of action for negligence, an
anomaly Moragne expressly sought to eliminate.59
Even if not so interpreted, Higginbotham still restores anom-
alies that produce "different results for breaches of duty in situa-
tions that cannot be differentiated in policy." 0 Once again an
artificial line three miles from shore will determine the extent of
liability." Within the three mile limit a beneficiary can recover
all damages, pecuniary and nonpecuniary, under Moragne and
Gaudet. Outside the three mile line, however, nonpecuniary
losses are no longer recoverable. Justice Harlan in Moragne ex-
plicitly denounced such an arbitrary line when he stated that "no
rational policy supports this distinction."62 Also, since Gaudet,
some courts have allowed spouses of longshoremen and seamen
to recover for loss of consortium13 in cases involving a nonfatal
injury.6 4 At least one federal district court recognized the right to
bring such an action for an injury occurring on the high seas.65 A
spouse, then, could recover loss of consortium damages in cases
of nonfatal injuries, but under Higginbotham the same spouse is
denied recovery if death, rather than mere injury, occurred on the
high seas. 6
58. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); see also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
59. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
60. Id. at 405.
61. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
62. 398 U.S. at 395.
63. Courts have not distinguished between loss of society and loss of consortium. See
Pesce v. Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 86, 91 n.1, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 453 n.1 (1975).
64. Lemon v. Bank Lines, 411 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Pesce v. Summa Corp.,
54 Cal. App. 3d 86, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1975). Contra, Christofferson v. Halliburton Co.,
534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976); Igneri v. Cie. Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). The courts allowing such an action have justified
such relief on the ground that there is no rational distinction between allowing a widow
or widower to recover and denying recovery to one whose spouse is severely injured but
survives. See generally Comment, Loss of Consortium in Admiralty, 1977 B.Y.U.L. Rsv.
133.
65. Francis v. Pan Am Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Del. 1975). Francis
used Gaudet as a justification for allowing loss of consortium. Id. at 1257 n.8.
66. For the application of Moragne to the high seas in areas other than wrongful
death, see note 12 supra.
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Not only does Higginbotham restore various anomalies to
maritime wrongful death actions, it also ignores the humanitar-
ian policy of admiralty law. 7 Because historically seamen were
young, poor, and away from home, courts recognized the need for
special protection for "this important class of citizens for the
commercial service and maritime defence of the nation."68 Fur-
thermore, extending broad remedies to seamen encouraged sea-
men to engage in hazardous voyages. 9 As Judge Chase stated in
The Sea Gull:10 "it better becomes the humane and liberal char-
acter of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the
remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and
inflexible rules."'" Legislative history, Moragne, and Gaudet all
indicate that DOHSA is not such an "established and inflexible"
rule. The Higginbotham Court should have allowed loss of society
damages as consistent with the traditions of admiralty law. 2
Until Higginbotham the modem trend in maritime wrongful
death actions, as exemplified by Moragne and Gaudet, was to-
ward a uniform cause of action. No longer would artificial lines
determine the extent of liability; no longer would liability dimin-
ish when the victim died. Such uniformity promoted efficiency
and eliminated anomalous results. Higginbotham, however, by
refusing to apply Gaudet to high seas wrongful death actions
retreats from the laudatory principles explicated in Moragne and
Gaudet and only creates further confusion. By holding DOHSA
damages to be exclusive, Higginbotham has clouded rather than
clarified post-Moragne maritime wrongful death actions.
Howard Hall
67. In a footnote Justice Stevens suggests that any loss of society award should be
"primarily symbolic, rather than a substantial portion of the survivors' recovery." 436
U.S. at 624 n.20. In many cases, however, loss of society constitutes the primary damage
suffered by the decedent's survivor, especially in cases involving the death of children or
the elderly where little pecuniary loss is suffered. See, e.g., Dagget v. Atchison, Topeka,
& Santa Fe R.R., 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957); Lane v. Hatfield, 173 Or. 79, 143
P.2d 230 (1943).
68. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1842) (No. 6,047).
69. Id.
70. 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12, 578).
71. Id. at 910.
72. See Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971). As noted by
Justice Harlan in Moragne, admiralty law recognizes "a special solicitude for the welfare
of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages."
398 U.S. at 387. Justice Brennan in Gaudet believed this special solicitude "compelled"
the Court's allowance of recovery for loss of society damages. 414 U.S. at 588.
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